关于十月革命与持久人民战争的关系
【供参考】
Since my blog has been invoked in this string, I feel I should factor into this conversation––mainly because I feel there is a certain misrepresentation of PPW as a “universal” theory of strategy, and the assumption on the part of some that this still seems to imply the particular form it took/takes in semi-feudal and semi-colonial contexts of “surrounding the metropoles from the countryside”.
The theory of PPW is raised as an alternative to the only other strategy of making revolution that is treated as normative: the theory of insurrection. The reason why PPW is seen as possessing any sort of efficacy is because insurrectionism, aside from the October Revolution, has only resulted in massive failure. Thus, to understand what is meant by PPW we first have to understand the the theory of insurrection.
Insurrection takes a very simplistic and unidirectional approach to making revolution. Engage in a protracted legal struggle, seeding members into “the most organized” ranks of the proletariat (i.e. usually trade unions) so as to push for an uprising. Such an uprising is usually understood as a general strike, though it has taken other forms. The point is that when there is a mass rebellion, and the masses arm themselves in this moment of insurrection, the party can take leadership. The people will confront the state, there will hopefully be a moment where the state forces “that abhor a blood-bath” (to quote a recent anarcho-communist conceptualization of the traditional Leninist theory) will be a split, causing members from the police and military to join the ranks of the revolutionaries. Then the party will take control and a civil war will we launched. Presto-chango, revolution.
Ever since the October Revolution, as aforementioned, this strategy has resulted in massive and tragic failure. As Karl Liebknecht pointed out in Militarism around ten years before the October Revolution, the emergence of capitalist militarization is such that this kind of strategy would have to be met with serious hurdles: state armies are not easily split, capitalist pacification is such that is trained to deal with this kind of simplistic strategy of revolution, and the state does not “abhor a bloodbath” when it is necessary to defend the state.
Now, when some of us argue that there was an untheorized PPW in the October Revolution we are not arguing that Lenin was a theorist of PPW, or that the Russian Revolution was fully an instance of people’s war, only that there was indeed some sort of process that allowed it to avoid the liquidation other attempted insurrections suffered. This point is not meant to indicate that the peasant particularities of Russia are universal (and thus we are not arguing for some peasant partisan war as being the hallmark of PPW), only that the ways in which the insurrection in Russia in 1917 were accomplished was part of a larger process, as well as as a social context that would have allowed for the splitting of the ranks of the army (i.e. the fact that most Russian soldiers in 1917 were not happy with being soldiers), a particularity that is not in the least universal.
So what do we mean by PPW? Axiomatically, the conceptualization that was provided by the PCP in 1988 and the RIM in 1993: accumulation of forces, strategic defensive, strategic equilibrium, strategic offensive. In other words a protracted and sustained process that begins with slowly accumulating revolutionary forces to produce a counter-hegemony so as to eventually launch a military operation (in the stage of strategic defensive) that will also work to continue to generate radical forces, further extending a counter-hegemony, to reach dual power (strategic equilibrium) and from this, hopefully, strategic offensive (the point where there can be frontal warfare that can take over the state). Obviously this will take different forms in different social contexts.
One reason we treat it as universal is because we believe it better communicates to the complexity of making revolution than the theory of insurrection which is overly simplistic. Why would we just work for the moment of mass rebellion where there is a strong chance, without slowly developing a military apparatus, we could be completely liquidated (as we have been)? Why not think of revolution in terms of a more sustained and necessarily protracted process that requires some sort of slow development of a parallel militancy that has the potential of surviving state liquidation? And what does this slow development mean? Building an organization that not only wages war on the level of propaganda and agitation, but also begins to think of how to clandestinely develop a people’s army in a slow and measured manner. The alternative, as aforementioned, is just to throw all of our eggs in the basket of insurrection and hope that the state doesn’t massacre us in the moment of uprising.
Another and more significant critique of this theory of strategy (which really hasn’t been raised due to the focus on the particular aspects of PPW), is the problem of “red bases” and “liberated zones”. That is, if such a slow and sustained war against the state was to survive (and keep in mind that the easy answer and quick revolutionary solution of insurrectionism has not survived historically), it requires spaces in which a people’s army can demonstrate its hegemony and convince the masses that it is an alternative power to the state. This is why PPW seems to be contingent on a semi-feudal/semi-colonial context due to unpoliced spaces of the “country-side” where such revolutionary movements are carried out. And yet we do have innumerable historical examples of the potential of red bases. Take, for example, the Troubles in Belfast: there were entire areas in the cities where the police and the military refused to enter (“no-go zones”) that were under the control of community forces. These community forces were the rule of law in these zones, the problem was that they did not possess the kind of politics that a communist PPW would have enforced. Even still, they proved that the possibility of such autonomous zones was possible. Link that to a slowly developing and over-arching movement and you have the glimmers of a solution that the theory of insurrection cannot provide.
Point being, to sum all of this up, the theory of PPW is actually something that is more measured and less “adventurist” than the theory of insurrection, which is the only other coherent theory of strategy out there. Indeed, “focoism” is actually a variant of insurrectionism since it is designed to force insurrection––as T. Derbent has pointed out in his many works on revolutionary military strategy.
https://www.reddit.com/r/communism101/comments/28uk4v/within_the_theory_of_the_universal_application_of/
October road or really no road at all?
Sison writes:
“In imperialist Russia, the Bolsheviks had the foresight to sow cadres as revolutionary seeds within the Tsarist army. When the masses of troops became discontented like the people in the course of World War I, they rose up to overthrow the Tsar and then the Kerensky bourgeois government. Subsequently, they waged a successful war against the reactionaries and the foreign interventionists in the countryside of the vast Russian empire.”
On the question of Russia, the Communist Party of Peru stated in the above mentioned document:
“In the final analysis, the October Revolution was not only an insurrection but a revolutionary war that lasted for several years. Consequently, in the imperialist countries the revolution can only be conceived as a revolutionary war which today is simply people’s war.”
The armed struggle of Russia in 1917 cannot be mentioned without also bringing forward the failed revolution of 1905. This was pretext to 1917. And the war lasted to 1921, over a span of 15 years, where there was a lot of armed activity not only in 1905 and 1917. But still, we have had to wait for more than a hundred years for any Western “acumulationists” to finally accumulate enough forces, and also experiencing what Sison explain as the necessary objective conditions: “the capitalist state (…) [in] grave debilitation by its internal crisis, the crisis of the world capitalist system, involvement in an inter-capitalist or inter-imperialist war“. No wonder we have waited for a long time, and by this method one could go on forever, was it not for the fact that imperialism is doomed. These people want to do revolution by doing everything but revolution! This is a charade and an expression of intellectual bankruptcy.
Even the question of accumulation was answered by Lenin a long time ago, stating that only when they see Socialism triumph will the majority of the People finally be convinced.
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注意：jmp是修正主义者，请批判阅读。
PPW理论，作为唯一另一种被视为标准的革命策略——起义论的替代方案，被提出来。PPW之所以被认为有任何效果，是因为除了十月革命之外，起义主义只导致了巨大的失败。因此，要理解什么是PPW，我们首先要理解起义理论。
起义采取非常简单化、单向化的方式进行革命。进行一场旷日持久的合法斗争，把成员带入无产阶级“最有组织”的队伍(通常是工会)，以推动起义。这样的起义通常被理解为总罢工，尽管它采取了其他形式。关键是，当发生大规模叛乱时，群众在这个暴动时刻武装自己，党就可以起领导作用。人民将与国家对峙，希望有片刻，“憎恶大屠杀”（最近的无政府共产主义者对传统列宁主义理论的概念化）的国家力量将被分裂，使警察和军队成员加入革命者的行列。然后党就会掌权，我们就会发动内战。好像变魔术一样发生剧变，即革命。
如上所述，自十月革命以来，这一战略已经导致了巨大的悲剧性的失败。十月革命前十年左右，列伯纳赫特在《军国主义》一书中指出，资本主义军事化的出现，使这种战略面临严重的障碍：国家军队不易分裂，资本主义的绥靖是为对付这种过于简单化的革命战略而培养出来的，在需要保卫国家的时候，国家也不会“憎恶大屠杀”。
现在，当我们中的一些人认为十月革命中包含了没有理论化的PPW时，我们并不是在说列宁是PPW的理论家，或者说俄国革命完全是人民战争的例子，只是说确实有某种过程使它避免了其他未遂叛乱所遭受的清算。这一点并不意味着俄罗斯农民的特殊性是普遍的(因此，我们并不是在主张一些农民党派战争是PPW的标志)，只是说1917年俄罗斯起义的完成方式是一个更大的过程的一部分，以及允许军队分裂的社会背景(即1917年大多数俄罗斯士兵不高兴成为士兵的事实)，这一特殊性丝毫不是普遍的。
那么，我们所说的PPW是什么意思？从公理上讲，1988年的PCP和1993年的RIM提出的概念是：力量积累、战略防御、战略均衡、战略进攻。换言之，这是一个长期的、持久的过程，从慢慢积累革命力量，形成反霸权，到最后发动军事行动(战略防御阶段)，同时也将继续产生激进力量，进一步扩大反霸权，达到双重力量(战略平衡)，并有希望从这一点开始战略进攻(这一时间点可以进行可以接管国家的正面战争)。显然，这将在不同的社会背景下采取不同的形式。
我们认为它具有普遍性的一个原因是，我们认为它比过于简单化的起义理论更能反映革命的复杂性。为什么我们只为[如果不慢慢发展军事设备，有很大可能会被彻底清算(就像我们曾经的那样)的]大规模叛乱的时刻工作？为什么不考虑需要更缓慢，更持久的过程来进行革命，而这需要某种并行的斗争性的缓慢发展，而这有可能在国家清算中幸存下来？ 这种缓慢的发展意味着什么？建设一个不仅在宣传鼓动层面上开战的组织，也开始思考如何以缓慢而有分寸的方式暗中发展一支人民军队。如上所述，另一种选择就是把我们所有的鸡蛋都扔进起义的篮子里，希望国家不会在起义的时刻屠杀我们。
对这一战略理论的另一个更重要的批评(由于关注PPW的特定方面而实际上没有被提出)是“红色根据地”和“解放区”的问题。这就是说，如果这样一场缓慢而持久的反国家战争要继续存在(请记住，起义主义的简单答案和快速革命解决方案在历史上是不存在的)，它需要一个空间，使人民军队能够展示其霸权，并使人民群众相信它是国家的替代力量。这就是为什么PPW似乎取决于半封建/半殖民地的背景，因为在进行这种革命运动的“乡村”，没有警察的空间。然而，我们确实有无数的历史例子来证明红色基地的潜力。以贝尔法斯特的骚乱为例：在整个城市，警察和军队都拒绝进入社区部队控制下的“禁区”(“禁区”)。这些社区力量是这些地区的法治力量，问题是他们不具备共产主义PPW会执行的那种政治。尽管如此，他们还是证明了这样的自治区是可能的。将这一点与一场缓慢发展的全面运动联系起来，你就会看到一丝起义理论无法提供的解决方案的曙光。
要指出的是，总而言之，PPW理论实际上是比叛乱理论更有节制、更不具冒险性的理论，叛乱理论是唯一的另一种连贯的战略理论。事实上，正如T·德本特在他的许多关于革命军事战略的著作中指出的那样，“焦点主义”实际上是起义主义的变种，因为它是为了迫使起义而设计的。
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最近观察到了网络左圈寻章摘句攻击贡萨罗。
应有整体观点，历史观点和发展眼光。
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作者的意思是起义也是人民战争的一种形式。
出处：
The People’s War is the military theory of the international proletariat; in it are summarized, for the first time in a systematic and complete form, the theoretical and practical experience of the struggles, military actions, and wars waged by the proletariat, and the prolonged experience of the people’s armed struggle and especially of the incessant wars in China. It is with Chairman Mao that the proletariat attains its military theory; nevertheless, there is much confusion and misunderstanding on this issue. And much of it springs from how the People’s War in China is seen. Generally, it is considered derisively and contemptuously simply as a guerrilla war; this alone denotes a lack of understanding. Chairman Mao pointed out that guerrilla warfare achieves a strategic feature; but due to its essential fluidity, the development of guerrilla warfare is not understood as it exists, how it develops mobility, a war of movements, of positions, how it unfolds great plans of the strategic offensive and the seizure of small, mid-sized, and big cities, with millions of inhabitants, combining the attack from outside with the insurrection from within. Thus, in conclusion, the four periods of the Chinese revolution, and mainly from the agrarian war until the people’s war of liberation, considering the anti-Japanese war of resistance between both, shows the various aspects and complexities of the revolutionary war waged during more than twenty years amidst a huge population and an immense mobilization and participation of the masses. In that war there are examples of every kind; and what is principal has been extraordinarily studied and its principles, laws, strategy, tactics, rules, etc. masterfully established. It is, therefore, in this fabulous crucible and on what was established by Marxism-Leninism that Chairman Mao developed the military theory of the proletariat: The People’s War.
We must fully bear in mind that subsequently, Chairman Mao himself, aware of the existence of atomic bombs and missiles and with China already having them, sustained and developed people’s war in order to wage it under the new conditions of atomic weapons and of war against powers and super-powers. In synthesis, people’s war is the weapon of the proletariat and of the people, even to confront atomic wars.
A key and decisive question is the understanding of the universal validity of people’s war and its subsequent application taking into account the different types of revolution and the specific conditions of each revolution. To clarify this key issue it is important to consider that no insurrection like that of Petrograd, the anti-fascist resistance, or the European guerrilla movements in the Second World War have been repeated, as well as considering the armed struggles that are presently being waged in Europe. In the final analysis, the October Revolution was not only an insurrection but a revolutionary war that lasted for several years. Consequently, in the imperialist countries the revolution can only be conceived as a revolutionary war which today is simply people’s war.
Finally, today more than ever, we Communists and revolutionaries, the proletariat and the people, need to forge ourselves in: “Yes. We are adherents to the theory of the omnipotence of the revolutionary war. That it is not bad thing; it is good thing. It is Marxist”; which means adhering to the invincibility of people’s war.
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十月道路还是根本没有路？
西松写到：
“在沙皇俄国，布尔什维克深谋远虑，在沙俄军队里扩张党员干部，种下了革命的种子。当士兵群众和人民一样在一战中感到不满时，他们起来推翻了沙皇和克伦斯基资产阶级政府。随后，他们在俄罗斯帝国的广大农村里展开了一场战胜反动派和外国干涉军的战争。”
在俄国问题上，秘鲁共产党在上文提及的文件里是这样说的：
“最后，十月革命不只是一场暴动，而是一场持续了数年的革命战争。因此，帝国主义国家的革命只能是一场革命战争，在今天就是人民战争。”
提到1917年的俄国武装斗争，就不能不提到1905年失败了的革命。这是1917的前提。战争持续到了1921年，一共经过了十五年，每一年里都发生了许多武装行动，而不是只在1905年和1917年。即便这样，我们还必须要等上一百多年，好让西方的 “积累力量论者” 积累足够的力量，还要等到西松所谓的必要客观条件发生：“资本主义国家（…）的内部危机导致其被巨大削弱，世界资本主义系统危机，资本主义或是帝国主义之间的战争”。怪不得我们等了这么久。按照这种方式，要不是帝国主义必将灭亡，我们甚至可以永远等下去。这伙人革命的方式是什么都干，就是不干革命！这是一个荒谬的借口和理论破产的表现。
就连积累力量的问题也早就得到了列宁的回答。他教导我们，大多数人只有在见到了社会主义胜利后才会被说服。
西松写到：
“就算社会主义的物质基础在资本主义社会存在，无产阶级也必须要先战胜法西斯主义，在社会主义能够胜利前打赢争取民主的斗争。”
我们对这种论调很熟悉，因为我们自家的莫斯科派修正主义的“共产党”就是这样说的。这和苏修党校里生产出来的反霸权论差得不是很远：他们想让欧洲修党一刻不停地在西欧国家和议会里培养亲苏观点，与社民党的部分结盟。具体方案是这样的：“先保卫世界和平”（！）或者“先建立一个反垄断资本主义的政府”，然后再是社会主义革命。尽管这套理论伪装成要先战胜法西斯，再武装革命，它只不过是“和平演变”罢了。武装革命不会这样发生，也从来没有这样发生过。唯一一条砸碎法西斯的道路就是人民战争。唯一一条开展人民战争的道路就是把它当作一个军事化的毛主义共产党领导的群众的持久战，通过一支人民军队和一个统一战线开展
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连帝国主义者也理解人民战争的普适性
让我们先离开西松，听听托马斯·A·马克斯博士，一名在反叛乱行业从事的美帝政治风险顾问是怎么说的吧：
“只要谈到叛乱，就不能不谈到毛泽东的作品。他的创新产生了‘人民战争’，把不对称战争的挑战从战术和军事的层面上上升到了战略和政治的层面上。毛在非常规战场上的地位是和拿破仑，克劳斯维茨在常规战场上的地位一样的。”
还有：
“恰恰相反，正如毛一次又一次地解释过的，暴力在叛乱的任何阶段都是至关重要的。它只是被用在一个适合情况的水平上以消灭抵抗和政府存在，因而让叛军政治机构能够动员群众和资源。”
还有：
“哥革武的例子证明了，不管叛军是不是毛主义者，他们都必须要执行在兵法中得出的毛主义的战略要点。”
钻研游击战和暴动的资产阶级知识分子经常用这样的方式提到毛。他的人民战争理论对于这些人来说不是农民战争或是“农村包围城市”，而是把游击战争提升到了战略层面，总结了非常规，不对称或是游击战争的法则。资产阶级专家理解的东西，许多革命者还是不能掌握；毛泽东总结的人民战争是在全世界的所有国家都能适用的。它是无产阶级和全世界被压迫群众唯一的军事策略。
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同马克思主义者相反，一切机会主义者、新老修正主义者都反对无产阶级革命和无产阶级专政，因此也就必然极端害怕和仇视人民群众，讥笑、咒骂和破坏革命群众运动。当俄国一九〇五年十二月武装起义失败的时候，普列汉诺夫站在一旁指责群众“本来是用不着拿起武器的”。列宁愤怒地批判了普列汉诺夫这种对待革命群众运动的贵族老爷态度，痛斥他是臭名昭彰的俄国马克思主义叛徒。列宁指出，没有一九〇五年的“总演习”，就不可能有一九一七年十月革命的胜利。
是“not only”不是“not”
4．人民战争理论是国际无产阶级的军事理论。这个理论首次系统而完备的总结了关于阶级斗争、军事行动以及无产阶级的战争理论和实践经验，历史上漫长的人民武装斗争——尤其是中国的革命战争——的经验。毛主席总结了无产阶级的军事理论；但是，对人民战争理论有很多误解和混乱的认识。其中很大一部分来源于人们对中国人民战争的误解。通常，中国人民战争被轻视为仅仅是一场游击战——单这一点就已经说明这些人认识的肤浅。毛主席指出，游击战具有战略特征，但是由于游击战必要的机动，人们并没有正确认识游击战，这包括如何发展机动性、运动战、阵地战；如何实施战略进攻的伟大计划；如何将外部进攻和内部起义结合起来，夺取中小城镇和拥有数百万人口的大城市。据此，中国革命可以分为四个部分，主要是从土地革命战争，经过抗日战争后，再到人民解放战争；在这二十多年里，中国革命战争涉及了巨大的人口数量，人民群众广泛的动员和参与革命，展现了革命战争的各个方面和复杂性。在这一段历史中，研究工作需要的任何种类的例子都能找到，重要的内容已经被出色的做了研究，并且已经建立起了成熟的原则、规律、战略、战术、使用规则等等。因此，在革命战争的宏伟熔炉中，毛主席依据马克思列宁主义的原理，发展出了无产阶级的军事理论：人民战争理论。
我们也必须谨记，毛主席同时也明确认识到原子弹与导弹的存在和中国掌握了这些武器。毛主席进一步坚持和发展了人民战争理论，以便在核武器和核战争的新环境下发动人民战争，夺取政权和反对超级大国。即，人民战争理论是核时代无产阶级与人民的武器。
如何理解人民战争的一般有效性，以及随之而来的在不同类型的革命和相应的特殊条件下应用这一理论，是个关键而有决定性的问题。要明确回答这个问题，需要考虑到：在彼得格勒起义、反法西斯抵抗运动，或二战时在欧洲的游击战，这些例子没有原样重现过。最后，十月革命不仅是一次暴动，也是一次持续数年的革命战争。因此，在帝国主义国家只有通过革命战争——在今天来说也就是人民战争——才能实现革命目标。
作为总结，今天更甚以往的是，我们共产主义者和革命者，无产阶级和人民，需要依此宣誓：“我们宣誓，将依据马克思主义的原理，坚持革命战争的战无不胜的理论。”即，坚持战无不胜的人民战争理论。
（红色文献翻译 https://www.marxists.org/chinese/reference-books/peru--struggle/1-01.htm）
机翻：
4、人民战争是国际无产阶级的军事理论；其中首次系统完整地总结了无产阶级斗争、军事行动和战争的理论和实践经验，以及人民武装斗争特别是无休止战争的长期经验。在中国。无产阶级是在毛主席那里获得军事理论的；然而，在这个问题上存在很多混淆和误解。其中大部分源于对中国人民战争的看法。通常，它被简单地视为游击战而被嘲笑和轻蔑地看待；仅此一点就表示缺乏了解。毛主席指出，游击战具有战略性；但由于游击战的本质流动性，游击战的发展并没有被理解为它的存在，它如何发展机动性，一场运动战，一场阵地战，它如何展开战略进攻的伟大计划和夺取中小规模以及拥有数百万居民的大城市，将来自外部的攻击与来自内部的叛乱结合起来。因此，总而言之，中国革命的四个时期，主要是从土地战争到人民解放战争，考虑到两者之间的抗日战争，显示了更广泛的革命战争的各个方面和复杂性。二十多年来，在人口众多、群众广泛动员和参与的情况下。在那场战争中，有各种各样的例子；对原则进行了深入研究，巧妙地确立了原则、规律、战略、战术、规则等。因此，正是在这个神话般的熔炉中，毛主席在马克思列宁主义的基础上发展了无产阶级的军事理论：人民战争。
我们必须充分铭记，后来毛主席本人意识到原子弹和导弹的存在并在中国已经有了原子弹和导弹的情况下，继续和发展了人民战争，以便在原子武器和反战的新条件下进行人民战争。权力和超能力。总之，人民战争是无产阶级和人民的武器，甚至是对抗原子战的武器。
一个关键和决定性的问题是在考虑到不同类型的革命和每次革命的具体条件的情况下，理解人民战争的普遍有效性及其随后的应用。为了澄清这个关键问题，重要的是要考虑到没有像彼得格勒那样的起义、反法西斯抵抗或第二次世界大战中的欧洲游击运动重演，并考虑到目前正在进行的武装斗争。在欧洲。归根结底，十月革命不仅是一次起义，而且是一场持续数年的革命战争。因此，在帝国主义国家，革命只能被认为是革命战争，而今天只是人民战争。
最后，今天，我们共产党人和革命者、无产阶级和人民比以往任何时候都更需要锻造自己：“是的。我们是革命战争万能论的拥护者。这不是坏事；它是好东西。它是马克思主义的”；就是坚持人民战争所向披靡。
Spanish
4. La guerra popular es la teoría militar del proletariado internacional; en ella se resume, por vez primera en forma sistemática y completa, la experiencia teórica y práctica de las luchas, acciones militares y guerras libradas por el proletariado y la larga experiencia de la lucha armada popular y especialmente de las guerras campesinas de China. Es con el Presidente Mao que la clase logra tener su teoría militar; sin embargo, hay bastante confusión e incomprensión sobre este problema. Y la misma comienza por cómo se ve la guerra popular en China, generalmente se la considera, reducida y despectivamente como una simple guerra de guerrillas; ésto ya denota no comprender que con el Presidente Mao la guerra de guerrillas adquiere carácter estratégico; pero además, no se comprende el desarrollo de la guerra de guerrillas como desde su fluidez esencial desarrolla movilidad, guerra de movimientos, guerra de posiciones, desenvuelve grandes planes de ofensiva estratégica y conquista de ciudades pequeñas, medianas y grandes, de millones de habitantes, combinando el ataque desde fuera con la insurrección desde dentro. Así, en conclusión las cuatro etapas de la revolución china y principalmente desde la guerra agraria a la guerra de liberación popular, considerando entre ambas la guerra antijaponesa, muestran las diversas facetas y complejidades de la guerra revolucionaria librada durante más de veinte años, en una gigantesca población y una inmensa movilización y participación de las masas; en esa guerra hay ejemplos de todo tipo; y lo que es principal ha sido extraordinariamente estudiada y magistralmente establecidos sus principios, leyes, estrategia, táctica, normas, etc. Es, pues, en ese fabuloso crisol y sobre lo establecido por el marximo-leninismo que el Presidente Mao estableció la teoría militar del proletariado, la guerra popular.
Debemos tener muy presente que, posteriormente, el propio Presidente, con conocimiento de la existencia de bombas atómicas y cohetes y poseyéndolos, sostuvo y desarrolló la guerra popular para librarla en las nuevas condiciones de armas atómicas y guerra con potencias y superpotencias; en síntensis la guerra popular es el arma del proletariado y el pueblo incluso para enfrentarse a guerras atómicas.
Una cuestión clave y decisiva es la compresión de la validez universal de la guerra popular y su consecuente aplicación, teniendo en cuenta los diferentes tipos de revolución y las condiciones específicas de cada revolución. Servirá a esta cuestión clave considerar que no se ha repetido una insurrección como la de Petrogrado, la resistencia antifascista y las guerrillas europeas en la II Guerra Mundial, así como las luchas armadas que se libran en Europa actualmente; y ver que al fin y al cabo, la Revolución de Octubre no fue sólo insurrección sino una guerra revolucionaria que duró varios años. En consecuencia, en los países imperialistas la revolución sólo puede concebirse como guerra revolucionaria y ésta hoy es simplemente guerra popular.
Finalmente, hoy más que nunca los comunistas y los revolucionarios, el proletariado y el pueblo, necesitamos forjarnos en: “Sí, somos partidarios de la teoría de la omnipotencia de la guerra revolucionaria; eso no es malo; es bueno, es marxista”; lo que significa ser partidarios de la invencibilidad de la guerra popular.